The illusion of stakeholder governance: Corporate purpose or corporate spin?

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Abstract

The growing emphasis on stakeholder governance has fundamentally reshaped the corporate governance debate, challenging the traditional focus on shareholder primacy. The 2019 Business Roundtable (BRT) Statement marked a pivotal turn by committing signatory firms to consider the interests of all stakeholders. Despite this public pledge, substantial doubts remain about the depth and sincerity of corporate adoption (Bebchuk & Tallarita, 2020). This study assesses whether the 39 publicly listed companies that endorsed the BRT Statement between 2019 and 2024 have implemented concrete governance reforms. Through an empirical analysis of each firm’s published governance guidelines, examining board composition, committee charters, and reporting disclosures, we track changes over a five-year period. Our results reveal a significant divergence between proclaimed intentions and actual practice: most firms continue to anchor their governance structures in shareholder value, while only a minority exhibit genuine steps toward embedding stakeholder interests. Future research should integrate quantitative data on corporate behavior and stakeholder outcomes to provide a more comprehensive evaluation. Overall, this paper offers an updated empirical appraisal of whether leading BRT signatories have translated stakeholderism from aspirational rhetoric into governance reality.

Keywords: Shareholder Primacy, Stakeholder, Governance, Regulation, Business Roundtable

Authors’ individual contribution: Conceptualization — F.C. and G.C.; Methodology — F.C. and G.C.; Validation — F.C., G.C., and A.B.; Formal Analysis — F.C. and G.C.; Investigation — F.C. and G.C.; Data Curation — F.C. and G.C.; Writing — F.C., G.C., and A.B.; Visualization — F.C. and G.C.

Declaration of conflicting interests: The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

JEL Classification: D21, G34, K22, L21, M14

Received: 23.06.2025
Revised: 06.08.2025; 26.09.2025
Accepted: 03.10.2025
Published online: 06.10.2025

How to cite this paper: Camastra, F., Coniglio, G., & Blasotti, A. (2025). The illusion of stakeholder governance: Corporate purpose or corporate spin? Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review, 9(2), 20–33. https://doi.org/10.22495/cgobrv9i2p2